To his pupil Nero and to Lucilius (friend and, as metonymy, representative of the entire mankind), Seneca testifies to his pedagogic vocation. With conviction he applies himself to demonstrate the perfect correspondence between the Stoic doctrine and the educational strategy that he proposes. Firstly, the reciprocity of the relationship between educator and pupil appears fundamental; both further their individual knowledge. Secondly, the limitations of an ethical precept that is not anchored in the intensity and concreteness of human life becomes clearly apparent. Furthermore, it brings to question the weakness of a world vision not inspired by an innovative and original path. The starting point is therefore a rigorous examination of conscience to ultimately reach the revolutionary experience of risk in the moment of the last decision. In the name of truth the wise man must have the courage to embrace fate in order to really understand who he is (in a process of oikeiosis both as experience and as target), and he must instil in his pupils the courage to take risks along their own independent journey. In so doing, self-scrutiny and politics can become intertwined. It is herein that the educator s risk and responsibilities lie.
The Risk in the Educational Strategy of Seneca Stefano Maso (Università Ca Foscari, Venice) To his pupil Nero and to Lucilius (friend and, as metonymy, representative of the entire mankind), Seneca testifies to his pedagogic vocation. With conviction he applies himself to demonstrate the perfect correspondence between the Stoic doctrine and the educational strategy that he proposes. Firstly, the reciprocity of the relationship between educator and pupil appears fundamental; both further their individual knowledge. Secondly, the limitations of an ethical precept that is not anchored in the intensity and concreteness of human life becomes clearly apparent. Furthermore, it brings to question the weakness of a world vision not inspired by an innovative and original path. The starting point is therefore a rigorous examination of conscience to ultimately reach the revolutionary experience of risk in the moment of the last decision. In the name of truth the wise man must have the courage to embrace fate in order to really understand who he is (in a process of oikeiosis both as experience and as target), and he must instil in his pupils the courage to take risks along their own independent journey. In so doing, self-scrutiny and politics can become intertwined. It is herein that the educator s risk and responsibilities lie.
Thanks to the intercession of Agrippina, the new wife of the emperor Claudius 1 , Seneca had the opportunity to return from Corsican exile.
To Seneca, Agrippina committed the education of his son, the young Nero, so he could learn the overall basis of eloquence, which was considered a necessary art in order to manage power. This opened to the philosopher a double opportunity: first to test directly the value of the pedagogic proposal developed according to the Stoic doctrine, and secondly, to implement the precept according to which the political commitment is peculiar to wise men. In the first half of the V th century AD Joannes Stobaeus, one of the main sources for the reconstruction of Ancient Stoicism, summarizes:
to; politeuv esqai to; n sov fon kai; mav list j ej n tai` toiauv tai~ politeiv ai~ tai` ej mfainouv sai~ tina; prokoph; n pro; ta; teleiv a~ politeiv a~: kai; to; nomoqeteiǹ de; kai; to; paideuv ein aj nqrwv pou~. «The sage must go into politics, especially in those States that demonstrate to progress toward perfect government forms: he must also legislate and educate men». (Stob. 2.7, 11b, 10=14 = SVF 3. 611)
In full maturity Seneca finds himself undertaking a great task; the transfer of the most general theoretical assumptions of Stoicism. This inherently involved verification of the presumption that the ethic-social theory of Stoicism was not a pure logical elaboration, but implied a coherent development in the theory of political action (to; politeuv esqai and to; nomoqeteiǹ) and of didactic/pedagogic action (to; paideuv ein).
It is not clear that what Stobaeus summarizes above matches the results achieved
in the Ancient Stoa. However, it is clear that in Rome with Seneca we find exemplar affirmation. The Ancient Stoa, in fact, mostly concentrated on the study of human nature and questioned whether man s rationality can exist in harmony with the rationality of the universe 2 . This research resulted in the creation of fundamental elements such as the oJ rmhv (the impulse, the appetition), the pav qo~ (the passion), the lov go~ (the reason), the oij keiv wsi~ (the attraction, the propensity), the sugkatav qesi~ (the assent), the oJ mologiv a (the conformity with nature). From this point on, in the Middle Stoa and, in particular, with Panaetius, the urgency of a practical doctrine rose.
The focus of third doctrine was the concept of kaqhkon (duty). Later, Cicero 3 adapts this (and in particular the problem of duty ) to the roman context, favouring a functional interpretation of social ethics and, at the end, of politics tout court.
2 To the pages dedicated to human psychology by Pohlenz (1992) , I, pp. 111-58, it is necessary to add at least the analysis of Inwood (1985), pp. 18-101, and Long (1996), 134-55. 3 In reality we owe to Cicero the focus of what the Ancient and the Middle Stoa had elaborated in relation to the doctrine of duty. In the De officiis in particular, Cicero certainly declines his inquiry in direction of a social application: cf. De off. 1, 9. On this see Inwood (2005) , pp. 114-19. On Panaetius and on his presumed reinterpretation of the theory of action cf. now Alesse (1994), pp. 74-83. With Seneca it is ultimately necessary to highlight a new aspect: for the philosopher/preceptor it is not only a matter of testing the doctrine of power in a passive dimension, that for which the wise man is the one who knows how to resist to suffering and remain «constant» in the face of adversities, accepting with steady heart whatever fate reserves for him; it is also necessary, to measure the efficacy of the doctrine in the constructive phase. This phase occurs in the moments in which the strategies employed and the decisions reached are based in sapiens «agreement» with fate: in other words he recognises the line of his development and sets himself to willingly bring it about.
It is an issue of no small importance. In fact it is about educating oneself and progressively refining one s own interior tension in order to overlap the subject s will with the line of tension of all. Thus, in small stages, all the desires that feed the individual tension will no longer be irrational, but are brought back to their natural function, in harmony with the balance of Nature. And because (for his nature) man is not himself evil, there should be no particular problems in his education and guidance along the correct course. So when it is read:
Neminem mihi dabis qui sciat quomodo quod vult coeperit velle: non consilio adductus illo sed impetu inpactus est (Ep. 37, 5), it must be understood that at the origin there is an instinctive tension but after, on that it is grafted deliberation, there exists conscious will of deciding this or that, of realizing a certain desire or of banning another.
From this, therefore, the importance of an education that is capable of recovering rationally what a man, at first, non-rationally feels in himself. We must take note of this important notation; and since, as it has already been observed, man belongs to the development of the perfectly balanced natural totality, it happens that the interior impulse (impetus) will only originally be positive. In fact, for this reason (that is for this good original nature) man can find within himself the key to defend from evil and to consciously and absolutely want good:
Quidque facere te potest bonum tecum est. Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? Velle. (Ep. 80, (3) (4) .
That is: Will becomes the method with which rational control is translated into the a-rational forms of desire, the tool that allows to every single human being to become really «wise», which the truth of everything shows itself through, the truth of Only when the consciousness of being is in balance with the natural unfolding of world events (to which he belongs) can man be quiet and free. There are no debts; the language of law (ad rationem reddendam vocare, interrogare, ad iudicem venire, excutere, recognitio, speculator, censor, cognoscere, potestas, causam dicere, scrutare, remetiri, error, ignoscere, emendare, offendere) confirms the register that Seneca has adopted and the line along which he is moving. In the internal conversation with himself -a conversation that must occur daily because it is strictly linked to a training practiced tenaciously -Seneca structures his own personality and defines a method to educate himself. Praise and admonishment are part of the strategy. So, as with the self-precept technique, the real aim is seen only in the background and must be taken back to the perfect virtus from which the sapiens tends for his nature.
Seneca, in other words, is the living witness of a real and true paradox: he «is» wise (because he has consciously made virtus his reason of being) and, at the same time, «he must continue to be» wise. If the condition of Stoic sapiens is not, in roman contest, once and for all achieved, but it is such if and only if it is continuously witnessed in action; a self-check on internal action and, as necessary consequence, a willing to open toward the exterior. Seneca in fact will continue the day after day (and so every tomorrow of his life) to discuss, to educate, to write, to propose the Stoic doctrine as a life strategy. He will transpose his internal experience from its initial form to wisdom.
In this prospective he clearly shows himself as an original interpreter of the stoic doctrine of Ethics, perhaps a predecessor of that philosophic-practical active thought that will find in Epictetus one of its main 8 characters.
Certainly in the educational strategy the reciprocal availability and willingness of both teacher and pupil is necessary. This means the recognition of the other and of the distinct roles that each individual unfolds. Seneca remembers with precision the walks himself and his teacher Attalus took, and the consequent discussions that allowed both to improve and progress along the path of wisdom. Enjoying time with a philosopher always brings some benefit, just as, under the sun, one tans even if he did not want to; or as when one, that stops a little in a perfumery, exits followed by scent: In effect both Nero and Lucilius are the most important recipients of the project and of the pedagogic action of Seneca. A cultured man, Seneca applies himself both toward his direct pupil and toward humanity at large, personified by his younger friend Lucilius. He imagines being able to admonish and correct the nature of the future emperor through a call to philosophy and also through the exercise of rhetoric and literary art. This broadens the horizon to humanity in its global aspect, he proposes to himself to add to the education, wisdom and virtue of any man that does not oppose or put up resistance (non repugnans) to philosophy.
In Nero s case Seneca will operate in very delicate conditions. The pupil, when young, will still be perceptive to his calls, the application of an elementary teaching by precepts will appear sufficient. This is the same type of teaching by precepts that initially Isocrates had used to teach the moves of fight to his disciple, but that his pupil, a little at time, had started to apply by himself 9 . Following this, in the moment of the succession to throne, the necessity to give solid support to an emperor that has the responsibility to act and decide for the good of his people becomes pertinent. At this level teaching by precepts is no longer enough, it necessitates that the practice of philosophical theories acquired and assumed the rule of behaviour. It would be necessary to pass from the kaqhv konta to the katorqwv mata, the operative indications concerning the direct knowledge of the correct path. But with the young Nero any effort seems useless, it is not enough to warn him from the negative outcome of anger 10 or to suggest to him the use of clemency 11 . Neither is the ingenious strategy of proposing to
Nero a gloomy representation of reality successful. This reality corresponds to a representation born in the tragedies; many scholars believe in fact that Seneca decided to compose them with a specific moral and pedagogic intent, to display evil in its most dramatic forms in order to avoid its practice. To the exhibition of the human being destruction should be able to oppose the affirmation of the positive hero. It is instead 9 Seneca does not seem to know Isocrates: perhaps he evokes it in tranq. a. 7.2, if we accept the correction ad loc. of Erasmus; in that passage Seneca is underlining how important is that the teacher fully understands the real aptitudes of the pupil: considerandum est, utrum natura tua agendis rebus an otioso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinandum, quo te vis ingenii feret. In any case it is important to understand how the greek paideia could be influenced inside the Stoic educational project in the roman contest; so promised Isoc., ad Demon. 12: «As bodies for the law of nature grow with proper efforts (toi` summev troi~ pov noi~), so the soul with wise precepts (toi` spoudaiv oi~ lov goi~). Therefore I will try to briefly suggest you through which practices (di j w| n ej pithdeumav twn) you can do huge progress along the way of virtue and enjoy good fame among all other men». 10 The dialogue De ira very probably had already been composed when Seneca had the charge of preceptor of Nero. It so could be dated back to 41 AD, after the death of the emperor Tiberius and before the exile. In any case the name of the recipient, the brother Novatus, indicates that at the time he had not received yet the new patronymic following the adoption (52 AD) by his teacher of rhetoric Junius Gallio. Cf. Giancotti (1957), pp. 98-102; Griffin (1976), pp. 396-98; Abel (1985) , p. 705. 11 The De clementia (written between December of 55 and December of 56) is directly dedicated to Nero. Cf. in particular Griffin (1976 ), pp. 407-11, Malaspina (2005 ), pp. 6-8, and Braund (2009 . Regarding the underlying moral for which the politic clemency and the clemency of judge must transform in an authentic prodesse toward subjects and toward man in general, cf. Bellincioni (1984) .
the Stoic sapiens the one to imitate 12 . So, along with the exemplar precepts offered to Nero in the De clementia, to which it is necessary to set aside the psychological stimulus represented by the positive hero to imitate, comes together as antithesis the obsessive description of evil that can derive from a bad use of power 13 . On one hand the good prince , on the other the tyrant .
As we know, Seneca is absolutely conscious of the difficulties of his task; he knows the court environment and the innate problems of translating into practice the moral teachings of Stoicism. He helps Nero in any way possible to realize a civil project useful to the People 14 , and facilitates independence from his mother Agrippina.
However, in the end, the operation fails and the amicus principis has to abandon his role as a tutor, as a teacher and then as counsellor 15 .
The situation for Lucilius is completely different. After renouncing the role of educator and counsellor of the prince, Seneca rediscovers his deepest inspiration, reopening the games addressing humanity through Lucilius. This must be interpreted Two letters specifically refer to this. The 94 and the 95 both have a particular function; primarily they are very large, totalling 147 paragraphs when combined. With the short letter 93 (only 12 paragraphs) acting as an introduction, they compose the 16 The treatise De beneficiis according to the internal clues and to series of indications derivable most of all from the Epistulae, has to be set in the period that follows Seneca s retirement from power; mostly in 62/63. Cf. Préchac (1972) , pp. I-XXVII. Griffin agrees (1976), p. 399. The topic faced and the moral proposal connected, cfr. Abel (1985 ), pp. 734-38, and, overall, Chaumartin (1985 , pp. 157-94: the scholar analyzes the relation preceptor/pupil underlining the critical points in the relation between Seneca and Nero. It is interesting to note that the treatise includes in itself aspects and argumentation that concern both to the concrete moral problems of individual and more generally to the social-politic environment, and that in respect of Seneca committing himself to interpret the Stoic theory. On this Inwood (2005b) , pp. 65-94. Referring to Dialogi, even for them it is necessary to imagine an universal recipient beyond the specific friends or relatives which they are occasionally dedicated to: Lucilius, Serenus, Novatus (= Gallio), Marcia, Paulinus, Polybius, Helvia. 17 Seneca specifies that the task to give advice does not only concern to pedagogue, as thought by the Stoic Aristo It is clear that the decreta, that Seneca also indicates as scita or placita (ep. 95, 10), correspond to the dov gmata of all theoretical sciences; just like astronomy or geometry, also the ars contemplativa (that is the theoretical study of philosophy) has its own principles. They aim to indicate that the general principles 18 applied to action are no doubt recta et honesta (ep. 94, 32) . In reference to this, the action of the wise man can only answer to the authentic oj rqo; lov go~, the correct reason, so it a katov rqwma is necessary as an action directed to rectitude.
Therefore it is possible to perceive, between the folds of this argumentation, a logical development, on the basis of which we can find the indissoluble relation between wisdom and correct action. This is the conclusion that, according to Seneca, belongs to the Stoic Aristo of Chios. For whom:
18 Seneca sustains that decreta philosophiae are practically a sort of generalia praecepta (ep. 94, 31) . These ones are opposite to specialia praecepta. Both «teach»: utraque res praecipit, sed altera in totum, particulatim altera. It seems to be a convergence, if not an underlying identity, for which ones without the others cannot be efficient, cf. Bellincioni (1978) on the other, the wise man was not born wise, but he has had to become so progressively. According to this it is necessary that decreta and praecepta appear and work in unison. Thus it is possible to know one s task, one s duty, as to correct action (katov rqwma). But this is not immediately followed by the specification:
Hic quoque doctus quidem est facere quae debet, sed haec non satis perspicit. (Ep. 94, 32) We must also consider other factors linked to the environmental and socialhistorical context in which one lives, and importantly, the different stages along the path toward wisdom that everyone walks. Seneca openly speaks about proficiens to indicate those who are walking toward wisdom; it is a path that can be so long that could last a lifetime and that can even develop, step by step, in a congenial way according to the different stages of life, from childhood through to old age 20 . It is those more specific praecepta that he needs, those that only the wise preceptor (or the teacher or the counsellor) will be able to propose him. Unlike the thinking of Aristo, decreta is not sufficient; on the other hand neither praecepta alone is sufficient. That is, those warnings which indicate, circumstance by circumstance, what an individual is meant to do: the officium, the kaqhkon
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. Specialia praecepta (ep. 94, 31). These are themselves endless, since the different circumstances in which they occur are endless. Consequently, if someone thought of having to always decide only on the basis of detailed and personalized instructions, he would risk being unable to act or to proceed on his own. Seneca is explicit regarding this, he does not hesitate to suggest that to allow every proficiens to catch sight of his own path the purpose of an educational project. Certainly the teacher will be sensitive to character differences, for in some cases he intervenes with the necessary iudicium: hoc vitabis, hoc facies (ep. 94, 50). In particular the weaker characters will tend to hesitate to take the initiative on their own. They lack confidence to the point that they risk losing sight of the real good:
wisdom. It is right, in these cases, to intervene: But it is evident that, everything aside, the way of wisdom is available to all. This is because it is not Nature that sets us on the path to vice; Nature generated us pure and free: Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: illa integros ac liberos genuit (Ep. 94, 56) .
Proficiens must therefore be thought of as receiving the correct precepts, and as being able to insert them in an educational project perfectly complying with Nature.
Such proficiens will eventually gain his own independence and, in turn, will be able to explore new ways of teaching to others how best to become virtuous.
In another important letter, the 33, Seneca focuses on the following passage, directly facing his friend Lucilius and inviting him to take charge of his own responsibilities, to take charge of the possibility of exhibiting his own virtue: Between decreta and praecepta the individual training continues, and in parallel, so does the teacher s job.
Each must take charge of his own task and, most importantly, must take responsibility for his own decisions. The real teacher must take his own risks; he must know when to loosen or tighten the harness and, in so doing, he must consider the pupil s character. But most of all he must know when it is the right moment to «leave» the harness to the pupil. For the pupil then, something similar occurs in parallel; he will have to understand when the right moment to independently from his teacher arises.
Then he will no longer depend on his models, nec ad exempla pendere et totiens respicere ad magistrum (ep. 33, 8-9 ).
In the dimension of action we see the triumph of what was proposed by the theory of the Stoic doctrine. It can be a private or personal path, or an openly public and politic one. Regardless, the risk of «jumping» must be taken, and with it the responsibility.
Seneca, in a beautiful reinterpretation of the myth of Phaëton, alludes to the importance of decision making and to the risks associated with; (a) the adolescent reaching maturity; (b) the teacher (or the parent) assumption of the responsibility to stand aside and (c) the philosophical theory of Stoicism and the deterministic and providential structure that sustains him. This structure must be able to provide support against unforeseen shortcomings.
The aforementioned passage belongs to De providentia, a dialogue that has been problematic concerning the temporal collocation. However, beyond the doubts that persist, the global picture and the argumentations that spur the latest commentator 23 to propose a late dating (around 64) are convincing. That is, in parallel to the writing of Naturales quaestiones and of Epistulae, both dedicated to Lucilius. In my opinion this late dating sits comfortably with the meaning of the myth of Phaëton; a call to responsibility and to courage that whoever embraces Stoicism must demonstrate. So it is not an invitation to bear difficulties, pain and isolation but rather one to take and claim all the risks that are implicit in the arduous walk of virtus. As soon as the 23 Cf. Lanzarone (2008 ), pp. 13-18. Neither Giancotti (1957 ), pp. 308-09, nor Griffin (1976 , pp. 400-01, are able to solve the issue, for whom the dialogue results not datable. Also Dionigi (1994) , pp. 5400-04, appears very undecided even if he considers the low dating «undoubtedly more credible».
proficiens starts making his own decisions, he becomes «willing» and in harmony with the fate that anyway is meant for him 24 . This is a fate that belongs to «Nature» in its cosmic dimension, a fate that sees itself resolving any contradictory element; including the possible (but necessary) failures. In De prov. 5, 9-11 Seneca rhetorically questions the reason for god s iniquitous allocation of fate among men, highlighting that good men often bear major blows of adverse fortune. The fact is that virtue is only virtuous if it is tested. Moreover, if it is true that the wise man only appears wise in the moment he displays his virtue through action, then the disgraces and misfortunes of life will appear decisive in order to be successful.
At this point, the adventure of Phaëton, the young adolescent, son of the Sun and of the Oceanid Clymene, is quoted. Phaëton, with a subterfuge managed to get his fathers permission to drive the cart, but eventually ended his race by falling into the It is a man s task to take charge of his own condition. Learning this craft with a perfect cognition of causes under the sign of truth; this was the task of the pupil Nero, and perhaps Lucilius, but it definitely belonged to the wise stoic. The decision of Phaëton sets this approach in the dimension of the tragic and heroic; now his condition is comparable to that of Hercules, the hero that bears his destiny with the prospective of reaching the sky and the sky constellations 27 . That is truly recognising one s virtue and celebrating the Stoic ideal. With Phaëton and Hercules, the stoic sapiens aims to verify what he has understood to be the inescapable starting condition, that to «endanger» himself in the prospective of destiny. And so he matches his proper internal tension with the needs of development and realization of humanity. This is the line along which Stoic philosophy develops, in the moment that makes itself interpreter of the most radical sense of «risk», an operation that is both revolutionary and indispensable to existence 28 .
This is not a case to put to paideuv ein and to politeuv esqai, instead it must be intertwined in the active interpretation of Roman Seneca, if the original predisposition of the human subject is to be recognized in the social dimension: in spite of contradictions and compromises, despite the apparent refusals: but because of deeper and secret expectations. 
